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Four studies (total n = 961) developed and validated the Adolescent Conspiracy Beliefs
Questionnaire (ACBQ). Initial items were developed in collaboration with teachers. An
exploratory factor analysis (Study 1, n = 208, aged 11–14) and a student focus group
(N = 3, aged 11) enabled us to establish the factor structure of a 9-item scale. This was
replicated via confirmatory factor analysis in Study 2 (N = 178, aged 11–17), and the scale
displayed good convergent (i.e., relationship with paranoia andmistrust) and discriminant
validity (i.e., no relationship with extraversion). Study 3a (N = 257) further tested
convergent validity with a sample of 18-year-olds (i.e., relationship with adult-validated
measures of conspiracy beliefs) and demonstrated strong test–retest reliability. Study 3b
(N = 318) replicated these findings with a mixed-age adult sample. The ACBQ will allow
researchers to explore the psychological antecedents and consequences of conspiracy
thinking in young populations.
Statement of contribution
What is already known on this subject?
 Conspiracy theories can have a significant impact on societal issues.
 Despite their social importance, it is difficult to examine conspiracy beliefs across the lifespan.
 Conspiracy belief measures are designed for adults and cannot capture the beliefs of adolescents.
What does this study add?
 We have developed and validated a novel measure of conspiracy beliefs suitable for adolescents.
 The measure will be invaluable for learning how conspiracy beliefs change across the lifespan.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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Conspiracy theories are abundant on socialmedia and the internet (Vosoughi, Roy,&Aral,
2018), ranging from those that are implausible to most people (e.g., that lizard aliens
control the world) to those that people tend to find appealing (e.g., that governments spy
on citizens). Around 60% of British people believe in at least one conspiracy theory
(YouGov, 2019), and in an effort to explain this popularity, research on the psychology of
conspiracy theories has grown significantly in recent years (Douglas & Sutton, 2018).
However, this research to date has focused only on adult samples, and no studies have
examined conspiracy beliefs amongst younger people. This is an important oversight
because it means that we cannot know when and how conspiracy beliefs develop and
how they may change as young people mature. This lack of research is perhaps
understandable given that existing quantitative measures of conspiracy beliefs designed
for adults cannot adequately capture the emerging conspiracy beliefs of younger people.
The language in thesemeasures is often too complex for a young audience. Suchmeasures
also often ask about events that are unlikely to be familiar to adolescents (e.g., the death of
Diana, Princess of Wales), and the content may be upsetting (e.g., assassination and
terrorism). It is therefore vital to develop a measure specifically targeted at young people
which is easy to understand, familiar, and that considers the potential emotional impact of
conspiracy theories. The current research therefore developed and validated a conspiracy
belief questionnaire suitable for adolescent populations.
Conspiracy theories are explanations for events that implicate secretive and powerful
groups who cover-up information to suit their interests (Douglas, Sutton, & Cichocka,
2017). Conspiracy theories tend to flourish in times of societal crisis (van Prooijen &
Douglas, 2017), during which people need to make sense of a chaotic world (Franks,
Bangerter, Bauer, Hall, & Noort, 2017). However, it is not clear whether conspiracy
theories satisfy this, or other psychological needs (see Douglas et al., 2017). Instead, they
appear to have a range of negative consequences, including reducing engagement with
politics and climate-friendly behaviour (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a), increasing the
likelihood that people engage in everyday crimes (Jolley, Douglas, Leite, & Schrader,
2019), and leading to disengagement in the workplace (Douglas & Leite, 2017).
Conspiracy theories can also impact health behaviours, such as reducing people’s
intentions to vaccinate (Jolley & Douglas, 2014b), and their intentions to engage in other
behaviours to stop the spread of diseases (e.g., COVID-19, Biddlestone, Green, &Douglas,
2020). Furthermore, conspiracy theories can fuel intergroup conflict and prejudice
(Kofta, Soral, & Bilewicz, 2020), which can even generalize to other groups who are not
involved in the alleged conspiracies (Jolley, Meleady, & Douglas, 2020).
Despite their significance, it is currently difficult to examine conspiracy beliefs across
the lifespan. All of the existing research on conspiracy theories has been conducted with
adult participants, which severely limits our understanding of how conspiracy beliefs
emerge and evolve over the lifespan. There are good reasons to examine conspiracy
beliefs in younger people. Specifically, stress is more common in adolescence than at
other periods (Arnett, 1999). Adolescence is also characterized by perceived social
vulnerability and threat (Bird, Waite, Rowsell, Fergusson, & Freeman, 2017). Further-
more, during middle adolescence (aged 13–15), young people are less likely to rely on
emotion regulation strategies than at other points in their life (Zimmermann & Iwanski,
2014). Such low reliance on emotion regulation has been identified as a risk factor for
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general and social anxiety in adolescence (Lougheed&Hollenstein, 2012), and existential
factors such as these are associated with conspiracy beliefs in adults (see Douglas et al.,
2017). Adolescence is also a time where young people are developing into new roles
within their families, communities, and wider society (Gowers, 2005). This increasing
awareness of the broader social world and the uncertainty of their place within it may
make adolescents more likely to be drawn to conspiracy theories. To date, however,
without a focus on young people, such important questions have been neglected in
research on conspiracy theories.
A significant barrier to studying conspiracy beliefs in adolescents is that questionnaires
tomeasure conspiracy beliefs have, to date, been designedwith only adults inmind. Some
scales ask about events that are likely to be unfamiliar to young people, and others
measure belief in complex abstract notions of conspiracy which are also likely to be
challenging for younger people to understand (e.g., governments use mind-control
technologies to control the population; Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 2013; Imhoff &
Bruder, 2014). Others use items that are less suitable for a younger audience due to
sensitive or potentially upsetting content (e.g., governments involved in the distribution
of illegal drugs, Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Furnham, 2010) and some use language
that is too complex (e.g., ‘The power held by heads of state is second to that of small,
unknown groups who really control world politics’, Brotherton et al., 2013). Taken
together, existing measures are therefore less than ideal for measuring conspiracy beliefs
amongst younger people.
The current research
Considering the importance of exploring the psychological antecedents and conse-
quences of conspiracy theorizing in society, it is vital to develop a measure that is suitable
for younger populations. In the current research, we developed and validated the
Adolescent Conspiracy Belief Scale (ACBQ) in four studies. Study 1 involved bringing
together current adult measures of conspiracy beliefs and working with a panel of
experienced secondary school teachers to narrow these down and modify any which
were thought to be inappropriate for young people. After modification, the items were
testedwith youngpeople to examine the factor structure using exploratory factor analysis
(EFA). Qualitative feedback was provided on the measure during a focus group. Study 2
was designed to replicate the factor structure through confirmatory factor analysis (CFA)
with a further sample of young people and to examine the convergent and discriminant
validity of the scale. Studies 3a and 3b provided an additional test of convergent validity
with an adult sample and also allowed us to explore test–retest reliability of the ACBQ. In
each study, we also examined whether there were age group differences in conspiracy
beliefs. Studies have shown that middle adolescence is characterized by increased
emotional instability (Soto, John, Gosling, & Potter, 2011), which increases rates of
anxiety during this period (Lougheed & Hollenstein, 2012). Conspiracy beliefs may
develop during this period of emotional instability. However, developmental trends in
conspiracy beliefs have never been examined.We report allmeasures,manipulations, and
exclusions in these studies either within the text or a footnote. Each studywas conducted
in accordance with the British Psychological Society Code of Ethics and Conduct and
received ethical approval from the relevant university ethics panel.
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STUDY 1
In Study 1, we reviewed existing questionnaires that measure conspiracy beliefs in adults
and developed a long list of potential items suitable for the ACBQ. These items were then
presented to, and discussed with, a panel of experienced secondary school teachers in a
face-to-face meeting. Following this discussion, items were refined or removed. British
school students in Years 7 and 9 (ages 11–12 and 13–14) were then invited to complete
the preliminary items for inclusion in the ACBQ and the factor structure, and internal
consistency of the scale was examined. A focus group with Year 7 students was also
conducted to gain qualitative feedback on the measure, which helped to ensure that the
wording of the items was appropriate for our youngest participants. We then examined
age differences in responses to the ACBQ.
Method
Participants
Initially, 216 young people were recruited from a secondary school in the Midlands, UK.
However, eight participants indicated at the end of the survey that they would like their
data not to be included in the analysis, and they were therefore removed. Of the final
sample (n = 208), 110 were recruited from Year 7 (age 11–12) and 98 from Year 9 (age
13–14). There were 103 girls, 94 boys, and 11 who did not say, with a mean age of 12.59
(SD = 1.12). Two hundred and two (97%) indicated that English was their first language
and that they were born in the UK.1 See Table 1 for a specific breakdown of participants
per group. The focus group that took place after the survey completion comprised of
three young people (one girl and two boys, all aged 11, who were British).
Materials and procedure
To create our initial pool of items, we began by listing the existing adult measures of
conspiracy belief published up until 2018. After compiling 133 items from 14 existing
questionnaires that measure conspiracy belief in adults, each item was reviewed
independently by the first three authors. During a team discussion where each item and
our comments were reviewed, an item was either kept without change, modified (e.g.,
due to complex language), or removed (e.g., due to repetition; examples can be found in
the Supporting Information). A pool of 60 items remained as an outcome of this process.
These items represented conspiracy theorizing (e.g., both specific to a theory such as
concerning the Apollo moon landing, or broader such as the proposal that governments
are involved in secret plots and schemes) and included both positive and negatively
worded items. These 60 items were then given to an independent panel of teachers in
December 2018,whowere experienced secondary school teachers based in a town in the
Midlands, UK (N = 3). We discussed each item and either a) removed items that the
teachers identified as being unclear, potentially upsetting, or where they did not believe
that students would know of the conspiracy (e.g., the financial crash of 2008) or b)
1 In each study, a non-parametric t-test (Kruskal–Wallis) demonstrated that there were no differences between participants with
English as their first language (vs. first language was not English) on their ACBQ scores. This provides initial evidence that
participants’ first language did not impact comprehension.
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modified the language and the item was retained (example discussions and decisions can
be found in the Supporting Information, Table S1). From thismeeting, 36 items remained.
These were tested on the sample of young people to explore the factor structure.
Parents/guardians provided (opt-in) informed consent. Data collection took place in a
school IT classroom, and before beginning the questionnaire, the participants also gave
their verbal assent. Participants responded to each item on a seven-point scale, with
anchors 1 (strongly disagree) and 7 (strongly agree). Itemswere computed so that higher
values represent greater belief in conspiracy theories. At the end of the study, the
participants were asked to re-confirm that theywere happy for their data to be used in the
analysis. We then thanked them for their time, verbally debriefed them, and provided a
written debrief for their parents/guardians. We also asked the participants to indicate if
they would like to provide feedback during a focus group. Sixty-eight (33% of the sample)
indicated they would be happy to provide further feedback, and three were chosen by a
teacher to be involved in the focus group. During the focus group, which lasted 20 min,
the participants were asked 10 questions about their experiences in answering the ACBQ
(e.g., ‘Was there anything in the questions that you had not heard of?’, ‘Did the rating scale
make sense (i.e., from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)’, ‘Do you think answering
questions like that would upset some kids’). At the end, the three participants were given
an additional debrief sheet and thanked for their time.
Results and discussion
Focus group
Comments from the focus group were transcribed, and the content was reviewed by the
team. Thematic analysis or another analytic strategy was not used as the aim of the focus
group was to ensure that young people understood the questions and that they were not
upset by any items. Theparticipants indicated that the rating scalemade sense to themand
that they enjoyed completing the questionnaire on a computer (as opposed to
hypothetically completing the questionnaire on paper). They also felt that the content
of the questionnaire would not be upsetting to others in their age group (Year 7).
However, they felt that some items were outdated (e.g., the participants said that they did
not know who John F. Kennedy (JFK) was) and some words were confusing (e.g.,
‘manipulate’). They also noticed some items were about the same topic (e.g., aliens), and
they found themselves reconsidering their answers when repeatedly asked.
Table 1. Demographic characteristics of the young people in Study 1 (n = 208)
Year
groups
(UK) Size Mage (SD) Age range Genders First language UK born
7 110 11.63 (0.48) 11–12 56 girls, 46 boys,
8 who rather not say
98% English 96% UK born
9 98 13.66 (0.48) 13–14 47 girls, 48 boys,
and 3 who rather not say
96% English 96% UK born
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Factor analysis
EFA using principal axis factoring method was then conducted on the 36 items that
comprised the preliminary ACBQ. The ratio of participants to items was six, which falls
within the rule of thumbof five to 10 respondents to eachone item for EFA (Comrey&Lee,
1992). Based on the scree plot, an eight-factor solution was initially extracted. Although
they had been reverse-coded, all negatively worded items were shown to load onto a
single factor. There was no clear conceptual grouping to these items other than the
negative valence, so this factorwas dropped (Greenberger, Chen, Dmitrieva, & Farruggia,
2003). Moreover, three items loaded onto the same factor where there was also no clear
conceptual grouping (‘Some viruses and diseases are spread on purpose by terrorist
groups’; ‘The European Union tried to take control of the UK’; ‘Work bosses sometimes
manipulate their workers to benefit themselves’), and so these items were also dropped.
We then re-ran the EFA on the remaining 31 items. The significance of Bartlett’s Test of
Sphericity, v2(465) = 3,405.596, p< .001, and the size of theKaiser–Meyer–Olkinmeasure
of sampling adequacy, KMO = .92, showed that the 31 items had an adequate common
variance for factor analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).
Six factors emerged with Eigenvalues larger than 1.00.2 The six-factor solution
explained 62.23 of the total variance. Promax oblique rotation was used based on the
assumption that the factors should be related to one another. Following the rotation, the
first factor accounted for the largest variance. To determine acceptable factors, the
minimum eigenvalue of a factor must be one, and theremust be aminimum of three items
loading on each factor (Costello & Osborne, 2005; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Item
selectionwas based on the following criteria (seeTabachnick&Fidell, 2013): (1) If an item
loaded below .63 on a factor (where > .63 is classed as a very good loading), it was
removed, and (2) no cross-loads on another factor at around .32 or higher, otherwise itwas
discarded. As a result, four factors and 14 items remained (see Table 2 for the 14 items).
To explore the factor structure further, a parallel analysis of 1,000 data sets using a 95%
cut-off was conducted (O’Connor, 2000). The first six eigenvalues extracted from the
simulated data sets were equal to or less than 1.92, 1.77, 1.67, 1.59, 1.52, and 1.46,
respectively. In the data set itself with 31 items, only the first three eigenvalues of 11.72,
1.96, and 1.84 exceeded chance values. The fourth factor (1.54) was below the simulated
data. On inspection, the fourth factor focused on conspiracy theories involving aliens
(e.g., Area 51), whereas the other three factors focused on more generic notions of
conspiracy (see Brotherton et al., 2013). Since the alien conspiracy theories did not fit
with the overall theme of the other factors, and the parallel analysis found that this factor
did not exceed chance values, this factor was also dropped.
Considering that the scalewas intended for usewith youngpeoplewherewe aimed for
a short measure, we then inspected the retained factors to ensure that the items were
suitable. When inspecting factor 1, the research team agreed that item #1 was likely to be
confusing as there is no clear conspirator and #2 and #4 were worded very similarly.
Acting on the comments from the focus group in which the Year 7 participants were
confused by poorly worded items and items being similar, #1 and #4 were therefore
removed. We also changed the word ‘manipulate’ in item #10 to ‘control’ since the
participants in the focus group found theword ‘manipulate’ to be confusing. Althoughwe
believed all items to be suitable at the time of data collection, this feedback from the
participants highlights the importance of considering qualitative feedback alongside the
2 The scree plot (based on the EFA with 31 items) can be found in the Supporting Information (Figure S1).
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EFA. We re-ran the EFA with the two items omitted and a similar factor structure was
reported (although two new items were now included in the sub-scales, see Supporting
Information, Table S2). However, as the factor loadingswere stronger in the previous EFA
(with 31 items), we finalized the 9-item ACBQ based on those factor loadings.
At this point, there were three factors, each containing three items (see Table 2, in
bold for the 9 items retained) that reflect underlying aspects of conspiracy theorizing (see
also Brotherton et al., 2013). Factor 1 included items focusing on government secrets
(a = .71). Factor 2 reflected conspiracy theories about government complicity in violence
(a = .75). Finally, Factor 3 included items that focused on secret societies (a = .70). On
further inspection, correlations between each of the factors were positive and moderate
to strong, and each factor was strongly correlated with the overall mean of the scale (a =
.85,M = 3.73, SD = 1.20), as shown in Table 3. Since the internal reliability was stronger
when all itemswere considered as one scale than for each factor separately, and since each
factor was positively correlatedwith the others, the three factorswere combined tomake
a stronger unidimensional scale. The underlying factors being treated as one unidimen-
sional measure is similar to adult conspiracy theory measures (Brotherton et al., 2013). In
sum, the 9-item scale was shown to have very good internal consistency and provides a
measure that represents conspiracy beliefs in young people.
Comparison of ACBQ means
Wethen exploredwhether therewere any differences between younger (Year 7, aged 11–
12) and older (Year 9, aged 13–14) participants. To do so, we assessed measurement
invariance of the 9-item structure using a multi-group CFA (MSCFA). First, we examined
configural invariance, followed by metric invariance and then scalar invariance (see Van
de Schoot et al. (2012) for an outline of the process). We inspected the changes in model
fit statistics; however, as Dv2 is sensitive to sample size, Cheung and Rensvold (2002)
suggest that invariance can be concluded if DCFI ≤ .01, and DSRMR ≤ .01 or DRMSEA ≤
.015. As shown in Table 4, DCFI, DSRMR, and DRMSEA were within thresholds, which
demonstrates metric and scalar invariance across ages.
As we found evidence of measurement invariance, a comparison of the ACBQ means
was conducted. We found that participants in Year 9 (aged 13–14) had a significantly
higher belief in conspiracy theories (M = 4.03, SD = 1.05) comparedwith participants in
Year 7 (aged 11–12, M = 3.47, SD = 1.27), t(206) = 3.480, p = .001, d = 0.48. This
provides an initial indication that conspiracy theorizing might be heightened for older
than younger adolescents.
In summary, after developing a long list of potential items suitable for a younger
population with a panel of teachers, a 9-item factor structure was shown to be evident
Table 3. Correlations between each of the factors and the overall mean (ACBQ) in Study 1 (n = 208)
1 2 3 4
(1) ACBQ (9-items) – .88*** .81*** .81***
(2) Government secrets (Factor 1) – .61*** .66***
(3) Government violence (Factor 2) – .59***
(4) Secret societies (Factor 3) –
Note. ***p < . 001.
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during EFA. Insightful comments gained from a focus group with Year 7 students also
helped shape the final questions included in the ACBQ. In Study 2, we examined the
convergent and discriminant validity of the scale and endeavoured to replicate its factor
structure.
STUDY 2
Study 2 aimed to replicate the unidimensional factor structure of the ACBQ that was
adopted in Study 1 through CFA and to examine both convergent and discriminant
validity. Specifically, we examined the relationship between the ACBQ and other
constructs (e.g., paranoia, mistrust in different contexts, extraversion), which have been
shown in past research to correlate with conspiracy beliefs (i.e., paranoia, mistrust;
Darwin, Neave, &Holmes, 2011; Goertzel, 1994; Kramer, 1994), orwhere no relationship
has been shown to exist and there is no theoretical reason to predict such a relationship
(i.e., extraversion, Brotherton et al., 2013; Goreis & Voracek, 2019). We also targeted a
broader sample of adolescents from all stages of the UK national curriculum (also known
as Key Stage) as opposed to just focusing on younger participants (i.e., aged 11–14 as in
Study 1). In Study 2, therefore, we recruited a sample of participants from Key Stage 3
(aged 11–14, Years 7–9), Key Stage 4 (aged 14–16, Years 10 and 11), andKey Stage 5 (aged
16–17, Year 12 in our sample). We also conducted a comparison of ACBQ scores by age
group (determined by Key Stage) to explore whether any age group differences existed.
Method
Participants
One hundred and seventy-eight young people were recruited from secondary schools in
Scotland and the Midlands, UK. Participants were recruited from a broader sample from
Key Stage 3 (aged 11–14), Key Stage 4 (aged 14–16), and Key Stage 5 (aged 16–17). All
participants confirmed that their data could be used in the analyses. In total, there were
110 girls, 58 boys and 10 who did not want to say, with a mean age of 14.05 (SD = 1.77).
Onehundred and forty-five of theparticipants (81.5%) indicated that Englishwas their first
language, and 146 (82%) said they were born in the UK. See Table 5 for a specific
breakdown of participants per group.
Materials and procedure
As in Study 1, parents/guardians provided informed opt-in consent and participants also
gave their verbal assent. Data collection took place in a school IT classroom. First,
participants were asked to complete the 9-item ACBQ (a = .90), which was developed in
Study 1. Participants then completed a measure of paranoid thinking that is suitable for
young people (Ronald et al., 2014), which included 14 items (e.g., ‘I need to be on my
guard against others’, a = .91). Participants indicated their agreement on a five-point scale
(1 = not at all, 6 = daily). Next, participants were asked to complete the Extraversion
sub-scale of the Big Five Questionnaire – Children version (BFQ-C, Barbaranelli, Caprara,
Rabasca, & Pastorelli, 2003). There were 13 statements (e.g., ‘I like to meet with other
people’., a = .86), and participants indicated their agreement with each on a seven-point
scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Finally, participants completed two
independent items asking whether they trusted someone at school (‘Is there someone
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whom you can trust at school?’) and at home (‘Is there someone whom you can trust at
home?’) on a 3-point scale (0 = No, 1 = Sometimes, 2 = Yes, adapted from Wong,
Freeman, & Hughes, 2014). Each of the scales, and the items within each scale, was
randomized. At the end of the study, the participants were asked if we could use their data
in the analysis. They were then thanked and verbally debriefed, and a written debrief was
sent home for their parents/guardians.
Results and discussion
Factor analyses of the ACBQ
A unidimensional model with all items loading onto one factor was shown to be stronger
in Study 1 (e.g., improved Cronbach alpha), rather than an alternative factor solution. We
sought to replicate this using CFA and test the unidimensional scale against the alternative
three-factor model. We compared the models using standard fit indices (v2/df, CFI, GFI,
NFI, RMSEA). A v2/df ratio of fewer than three shows acceptable fit (Byrne, 2001),
alongsideCFI, NFI, andGFI indicate being above a value of .90 andRMSEAbeing below .08
(Bentler, 1992; Hu&Bentler, 1999). The ratio of participants to an item is 20:1,which falls
within the rule of thumb of 10–20 respondents to each one item for CFA (see Schumacker
& Lomax, 2015).
As expected, the three-factor model displayed poor fit according to the measured
indices, v2(27,N = 178) = 265.279, p < .001, v2/df = 9.83, CFI = .69, NFI = .67, GFI = .76,
RMSEA = .223, whilst the unidimensional model displayed better fit, v2(27, N = 178) =
106.357, p <.001, v2/df = 3.939, CFI = .90, NFI = .87, GFI = .87, RMSEA = .129. The
unidimensionalwas further improved by freeing someparameters. Specifically, themodel
was re-modified adjusting one covariance path at a time (Schreiber, Nora, Stage, Barlow,&
King, 2006). The re-modification resulted in adding covariance paths between the errors
of items 8 and 9, 4 and 6. After freeing those parameters, model indices further improved
and were above acceptable values as depicted in Figure 1, v2(27, N = 178) = 56.177, p
<.001, v2/df = 2.247, CFI= .96, NFI= .93, GFI= .93, RMSEA= .084. Although theRMSEA is
slightly above the threshold, the rule of thumb can be seen as overly strict when using
Table 5. Demographic characteristics of the children separated by age range (i.e., Key Stage in the UK
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small sample sizes (N < 250), where values approximating the threshold can be
considered satisfactory (Marsh Wen, & Hau, 2004). In sum, the unidimensional ACBQ
scale is superior to the alternative three-factor model.
Convergent and discriminant validity of the ACBQ
To examine whether the ACBQ has convergent validity, we examined constructs that
have been found to positively correlate with belief in conspiracy theories in adults. As
expected, mean scores of the ACBQ (M = 4.00, SD = 1.29) were positively correlated
with paranoia (r= .29,p< . 001,M = 2.27, SD = 0.94) and feelings ofmistrust at home (r=
.15, p= .042,M = 2.84, SD = 0.39). However, therewas no correlationwith scores on the
ACBQ and feelings of mistrust with someone at school (r = .02, p = .762, M = 2.57,
SD = 0.63). Next, to examine discriminant validity, we explored the relationship with a
constructwhere no relationship is expected. As anticipated, the ACBQwas not correlated
with a measure of extraversion (r = .11, p = .135,M = 5.03, SD = 1.00).
Comparison of means of the ACBQ between age groups
As in Study 1, anMSCFAwas conducted to examinemeasurement invariance of the 9-item
structure. As shown in Table 4, all model fit statisticswerewithin thresholds; thus, metric































Figure 1. The ACBQ confirmatory factor analysis path diagram loading onto a single factor in Study 2
(N = 178). Standardized regression weights and covariances are shown in the diagram.
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sizes between age groups in school, we conducted a non-parametric Kruskal–Wallis test
and found that participants’ age grouping (based on UK’s national curriculum Key Stage)
influenced ACBQ scores, H(2) = 11.72, p = .003. We conducted Dunn’s pairwise tests
comparing the three groups. Specifically, belief in conspiracy theories was significantly
lower in children aged 11–14 years (Key Stage 3,Mrank = 79.01 [M = 3.72, SD = 1.28])
than children aged 14–16 (Key Stage 4,Mrank = 107.54 [M = 4.67, SD = 1.27], p = .017)
and aged 16–17 (Key Stage 5, Mrank = 105.06 [M = 4.39, SD = 1.12], p = .027). There
were no significant differences between children aged 14–16 and 16–17 (Key Stage 4 and
5, p = 1.00). By the age of 14 (Key Stage 4), conspiracy beliefs appeared to remain
constant.
Taken together, the CFA confirmed the factor structure of the ACBQwith 9-items, and
we can be satisfied that the measure comprises one unidimensional construct. The
convergent and discriminant validity on the construct level was good, as was the internal
consistency reliability. However, although scores on the ACBQ were correlated with
feelings of mistrust at home, there was no correlation shown for mistrust at school.
Nonetheless, when taken together, this provides evidence that the ACBQ is an effective
measure of conspiracy belief in young people.
STUDIES 3A AND 3B
In Studies 3a and 3b, as a further test of convergent validity, an older group of participants
completed adult measures of conspiracy belief (e.g., the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs
scale; Brotherton et al., 2013) and the newly formed ACBQ. We recruited a sample of 18-
year-olds (Study 3a) who have recently left adolescence and a second sample that is more
diverse in age (Study 3b). Utilizing a sample of 18-year-olds allows the opportunity to
examine whether the ACBQ is associated with established forms of conspiracy
measurement that only exist for adult samples. Using adult measures to test convergent
validity is not suitable for younger populations (e.g., due to problematic wording such as
‘government is involved in themurder of innocent citizens’ [Brotherton et al., 2013]). In
addition, participants in both studies were asked to complete the ACBQ a second time to
provide an examination of test–retest reliability. We also explored whether there were




Two hundred and fifty-seven 18-year-old participants (172 women, 80 men, three trans,
and two indicated they would rather not say, 96.9% born in the UK, 97.3% English being
their first language) were recruited online via a UK-based online participant database,
Prolific (Time 1). All 257 participants were re-invited 14 days later to complete the ACBQ
a second time, and 175 participants responded (68.09% retention rate, 119 women, 53
men, two trans, and 1 who would rather not say, 96% born in the UK, 96% English being
3 As Study 3a and Study 3b were advertised at the same time on Prolific and were methodologically identical, other than the
inclusion criteria (3a: 18 years old; 3b: >19 years), participants who failed the inclusion criteria (3a: n = 24 participants; 3b:
n = 6 participants) were included in the respective study. Although the results were unchanged when these participants were
included, increasing the sample size strengthens the power of the studies.
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their first language). Participants were all residents of the UK and received a small fee for
taking part in the research.
Study 3b
Three hundred and eighteen participants aged 19 and over (Mage = 34.34, SD = 12.82,
243women, 75men, 98.7% born in the UK, 99.4% English being their first language)were
recruited from Prolific at Time 1. As in Study 3a, participants were re-invited 14 days later
to complete the ACBQ a second time, and 251 responded (78.93% retention rate,
Mage = 35.17, SD = 12.09, 199 women, 52 men, 99.2% born in the UK, 99.6% English
being their first language). All participants were residents of the UK and received a small
fee for their time.
Materials and procedure
Participants in both Study 3a [18-year-olds] and Study 3b [mixed-age range of adults]
completed the same materials. First, participants provided their informed consent before
beginning the study. Participants were then asked to complete the ACBQ as developed in
Study 1. The internal reliabilities of the ACBQwere good at Time1 (Study 3a: a= .87; Study
3b: a = .88).
Next, to provide an additional measure of convergent validity, we included two
measures of belief in conspiracy theories that have been validatedwith adult participants.
First, we included a measure of general conspiracy theorizing (Generic Conspiracist
Beliefs scale, Brotherton et al., 2013), which contains 15 statements (e.g., ‘The
government is involved in the murder of innocent citizens and/or well-known public
figures, and keeps this a secret’, 1 = definitely not true, 7 = definitely true; Study 3a:
a = .93; Study 3b: a = .95). The second measure assessed belief in real-world conspiracy
theories (Douglas & Sutton, 2011), and there were 7 statements (e.g., ‘There was an
official campaign by MI6 to assassinate Princess Diana, sanctioned by elements of the
establishment’, 1 = extremely unlikely, 7 = extremely likely; Study 3a: a = .83; Study 3b:
a = .85). Presentation of the two scales was counterbalanced. At the conclusion of the first
part of the study, participants were briefly debriefed, paid, and thanked for their time.
Fourteen days later, participants were re-invited to the study, where they completed
the ABCQmeasure for a second time. The internal reliabilities of the ACBQwere also good
at Time 2 (Study 3a: a = .88; Study 3b: a = .90). Afterwards, the participants were fully
debriefed, paid, and thanked again for their time.
Results and discussion
Descriptive statistics of the conspiracy theory belief measures in Study 3a (18-year-olds)
and 3b (mixed-age adults) can be found in Table 6.
Convergent validity of ACBQ
In the sample of 18-year-olds (Study 3a), ACBQ mean scores correlated strongly in the
expected directions with general conspiracy theorizing (r = .84, p < .001) and belief in
real-world conspiracy beliefs (r = .67, p < .001). These effects were replicatedwithmixed-
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age adults (Study 3b: r = .84, p < .001; r = .65, p < .001, respectively). This provides
supporting evidence that the ACBQ is capturing belief in conspiracy theories.
Test-retest reliability of the ACBQ
Within the test-retest sample, themean ACBQ score at Time 1 (Day 0) and Time 2 (Day 14)
for each study is shown in Table 6. The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) was
calculated and demonstrated a strong degree of reliability in test–retest for both studies
(see Table 7). Similarly, the correlation between ABCQ Time 1 and Time 2 was positive
and strong for both studies (Table 7). We also conducted a paired samples’ t-test to
confirm the scale’s repeatability; therewereno significant changes in either study over the
two-week interval (Table 7).
Comparison of means
As in Study 1 and Study 2, an MSCFA was conducted to examine measurement invariance
of the 9-item structure (see Table 4). We found that DCFI, DSRMR, and DRMSEA were
within thresholds for the ACBQ and general conspiracy theorizingmeasure. However, the
fit indices were not within range for the belief in real-world conspiracy theory measure,
which means measurement invariance cannot be concluded for this measure. We
therefore only explored differences between 18-year-olds (Study 3a) and the mixed-age
adults (Study 3b) on the ACBQ and general conspiracy theorizing measures (see Table 6
for comparison of means at Time 1). Belief in conspiracy theories was shown to be
significantly higher for 18-year-olds (Study 3a) than mixed-age adults (Study 3b) across
both conspiracy theory measures (ACBQ [t(573) = 2.267, p = .014, d = 0.21], general
conspiracy [t(573) = 4.065, p < .001, d = 0.34]). In these data, conspiracy theorizing
therefore appears to be higher during early adulthood in particular.
In sum, the pattern of results in both studies provides further evidence of convergent
validity of the ACBQ. The ACBQ was correlated with two adult measures of conspiracy
beliefs, belief in real-world conspiracy theories and general notions of conspiracy
theorizing. In addition, the ACBQ was shown to have strong test–retest reliability,
demonstrating that it can measure conspiracy theorizing and is consistent across a 14-day
time window.
Table 6. Descriptive statistics of the conspiracy theory belief measures in Study 3a (18-year-olds) and
3b (mixed-age adults) (Study 3a: full sample N = 257, test-retest n = 175; Study 3b: full sample N = 318,
test–retest n = 251)
Studies
Full sample Test–retest sample





ACBQ General Real-world ACBQ ACBQ
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
18-year-olds (Study 3a) 4.06 1.18 3.59 1.27 3.05 1.33 4.04 1.15 3.98 1.17
Mixed-age adults (Study 3b) 3.81 1.23 3.15 1.31 2.64 1.27 3.82 1.22 3.83 1.21
Note. General = measure of general conspiracy theorizing. Real-world = measure of belief in real-world
conspiracy theories.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
The current research has developed and validated a novel measure of conspiracy beliefs
that is suitable for younger populations. The ACBQ was constructed with a panel of
experienced secondary school teachers, and the 9-item factor structure was first
uncovered in Year 7 and 9 participants (ages 11–12 and 13–14) using EFA (Study 1). This
study also indicated that young people did not find the measure upsetting and that they
generally were familiar with the language and conspiracy theories presented. In Study 2,
the adopted unidimensional factor structure was replicated via CFA with a sample of
participants from Year 7 (aged 11–12) to Year 12 (aged 16–17). The scale displayed good
convergent (i.e., relationship with paranoia and mistrust) and discriminant (i.e., no
relationshipwith extraversion) validity. As a further test of convergent validity, in a sample
of 18-year-olds (Study3a), theACBQwas shown to correlatewith adult-validatedmeasures
of conspiracy beliefs, alongside strong test–retest reliability. These effectswere replicated
in a sample of mixed-age adults (Study 3b).
The ACBQ is a brief measure that is accessible to adolescents as young as 11 years of
age (i.e., Year 7 participants in the UK). Moreover, because the final items measure more
general conspiracy theorizing as opposed to representing current events (akin to some
existing adult measures, e.g., Brotherton et al., 2013 for a discussion), the ACBQ is not
time-dependent. This new measure is a validated resource that will enable researchers to
explore the psychological antecedents and consequences of conspiracy thinking in
younger populations. It will also enable researchers to explore the origins of conspiracy
beliefs. Such an investigation has not yet been possible because there has not been a
psychologically validated measure of conspiracy thinking suitable for younger people.
In our data,wehave also uncovered that conspiracy thinking appears to be heightened
as adolescents join Year 10 at age 14 (i.e., Key Stage 4 in the UK national curriculum).
Specifically, in Study 2, older children (aged 14–16) reported higher conspiracy belief
than their younger counterparts (aged 11–14). Interestingly, we also found that
participants who were 18 years old in Study 3a had higher conspiracy belief than
mixed-age adults (Study 3b), further demonstrating that adolescence could be a peak time
for conspiracy theorizing. The ACBQ will be invaluable in efforts to further understand
why this is the case. One contributor could be social media use, which is known to be
prevalent amongst adolescents (Best, Manktelow, & Taylor, 2014) and is likely to shape
young people’s beliefs about the world. Furthermore, we know that young people prefer
to get their news from social media as opposed to traditional news (Marchi, 2012) and that
the majority of young people do not consider the credibility of news stories on social
media (Ofcom, 2018). Since socialmedia are rifewith conspiracy theories (Vosoughi et al.,
2018), this could be the perfect storm for conspiracy beliefs to flourish in younger
populations.
Future research could also examine the psychological factors that are associated with
conspiracy theorizing in adolescents.Wehavebegun to explore links betweenconspiracy
beliefs and psychological factors as part of our scale construction, and initial evidence
suggests that paranoia and mistrust are associated with conspiracy beliefs in young
populations (i.e., showing similar relationships to those shown in adults). Other factors
such as critical thinking abilities could be explored (Stanovich & West, 2000), alongside
anxiety and stress (Bird et al., 2017). Psychological stressors could be particularly
important, as middle adolescence is a time when young people appear to rely less on
emotional regulation (Zimmermann& Iwanski, 2014),whichhas been linked to increased
rates of anxiety (Lougheed&Hollenstein, 2012). It is possible that conspiracy theories are
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appealing to young people in middle adolescence because they promise to satisfy
existential needs (cf. Douglas et al., 2017). Future research could explore this possibility.
Understanding the consequences of conspiracy theorizing in young populations is also
important – we know that conspiracy beliefs in adults can lead to potentially significant
consequences, such as an increase in prejudice and disengagement in social issues such as
climate change (see Jolley, Mari, & Douglas, 2020). Research using the ACBQ could
therefore lead to a deeper understanding of the consequences of conspiracy theories in
young people.
Although the current work offers a valuable contribution to the conspiracy theory
literature, it is important to acknowledge some limitations. Specifically, our focus has
been on validating the ACBQ on young people living in the UK, and this may limit the
generalizability of the results. However, the varying adult measures have been
successfully applied in a range of different countries and contexts (see Douglas et al.,
2019 for an interdisciplinary review), and the validity of these measures has not been
compromised. We are confident that similarly, our novel measure will not be country-
specific or time-dependent, especially as themeasure focusesmore on general beliefs and
not those which may be more specific to one country or time (e.g., the death of Princess
Diana). Furthermore, whilst we found that the ACBQ was associated with mistrust at
home, there was no relationship found with mistrust at school. This finding was
unexpected and merits further exploration to examine how different dimensions of trust
might be associated with adolescent conspiracy beliefs and ways in which these
relationships might differ to relationships observed in adult samples.
In summary, across four studies, we have developed and validated a novel measure of
conspiracy beliefs that is suitable for younger populations. The unidimensional ACBQ
comprises nine items, which is accessible to adolescents as young as 11 years old. As the
ACBQdoes not focus upon current events, this ensures themeasure is not context or time-
dependent. The ACBQ opens up new possibilities for research exploring the psycholog-
ical antecedents of conspiracy thinking in younger populations. It will be invaluable for
efforts to understand how conspiracy beliefs emerge and change across the lifespan, in
addition to exploring the consequences of conspiracy beliefs for younger people.
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